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MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: FROM THEORY TO 
POLICY
Dirk Schoenmaker* and Peter Wierts** 
Financial supervision focuses on the aggregate (macroprudential) in addition to the individual (microprudential). But an 
agreed framework for measuring and addressing financial imbalances is lacking. We propose a holistic approach for the 
financial system as a whole, beyond banking. Building on our model of financial amplification, the financial cycle is the 
key variable for measuring financial imbalances. The cycle can be curbed by leverage restrictions that might vary across 
countries. We make concrete policy proposals for the design of macroprudential instruments to simplify the current 
framework and make it more consistent.
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1. Introduction
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2007–9, mainstream 
thinking on financial policy was that it was sufficient for 
central banks and financial supervisors to monitor the 
soundness of individual financial institutions. But in line 
with the fallacy of composition, the system as a whole 
behaves differently from its individual components. A 
case in point is the fire sale of assets during a downturn. 
While understandable from the risk management 
perspective of an individual financial institution that 
wants to reduce its risk, such selling makes the price 
decline worse, causing a vicious downward spiral (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2011). Another example is that at the top 
of the credit cycle, individual financial institutions look 
sound because measured risk is low, while the financial 
system becomes increasingly fragile as imbalances build 
up (Minsky, 1986). 
That is exactly what happened in the run-up to the global 
financial crisis. The build-up of financial imbalances made 
the overall financial system fragile. A subsequent shock (in 
the form of the Lehmann collapse) led to the unravelling 
of the imbalances, exacerbated by endogenous feedback 
loops. The point is that (almost) nobody was watching, 
let alone preventing, the building up of the imbalances. 
Yet, Schularick and Taylor (2012) document more than 
a century of credit booms that turned to bust, with 
leverage cycles at the core of financial crises (see also the 
classic on financial panics by Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011). Moreover, the internal models used by banks for 
risk management assumed, and still assume, that risk is 
exogenous, while financial risk has a strong endogenous 
component (Danielsson, 2013).
Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) and Galati and 
Moessner (2013, 2014) provide excellent surveys 
on macroprudential supervision. While there is now 
consensus that financial supervision has to focus on the 
aggregate (macroprudential), in addition to the individual 
(microprudential), there is no agreed macroprudential 
framework for measuring financial imbalances and 
applying policies to correct such imbalances. This paper 
focuses on these two open questions in the so-called time 
dimension of macroprudential policy. The companion 
paper by Barth and Wihlborg (2016) in this issue, on 
too-big-to-fail, addresses the cross-sectional dimension 
of macroprudential policy. In our paper, we argue for a 
sector-wide approach, beyond banking. The conduct of 
macroprudential policy is challenging in the Euro Area, 
where the single monetary policy might aggravate credit 
growth in certain places, but not in others.
Our preliminary conclusion is that the evolution of 
macroprudential policy might well follow that of 
monetary policy. First, the theoretical framework of 
inflation targeting has been developed. Next, the inflation 
outlook over the medium term has been measured and 
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Policy Objective Ultimate goal
(typical instrument)   (level of impact)
Monetary policy Price stability
(short-term   
interest rate)  Stable and non- 
  inflationary growth  
  (economic system)
Macroprudential Financial stability 
(LTV ratios,  
countercyclical  
buffers)
Microprudential Soundness of Protection of 
(capital ratios) financial  consumers
 institutions (individual
  institutions)
Source: Based on Schoenmaker and Wierts (2011).
Figure 1. Policy framework for the financial and economic 
system
presented to central bank policymakers. This outlook 
has been used for analysing the monetary policy stance. 
Finally, the central bank has decided on its policy rate 
to ‘correct’ deviations from the medium-term goal. 
Although macroprudential policy is more complicated 
and multi-dimensional (Goodhart, 2014), the cyclical 
component of macroprudential supervision could follow 
the monetary path.
This paper follows the same steps. Section 2 discusses 
the theoretical framework for macroprudential 
supervision. Section 3 examines emerging approaches to 
measurement of the financial cycle. Section 4 proposes 
the use of a common leverage ratio, as a new policy 
instrument to contain excessive credit growth across the 
financial system, and suggests concrete steps towards 
its implementation, building on current legislation and 
policy discussions. Section 5 concludes.
2. The theoretical framework1
Macroprudential supervision is the missing link in the 
broader monetary and financial policy framework, as 
the global financial crisis and subsequent euro sovereign 
crisis painfully highlighted. In several nations, including 
the United States, Ireland and Spain, spectacular rises 
in house prices were accompanied by unsustainable 
credit growth. The bursting of the US bubble was not a 
microprudential, ‘bad loan’ event, but triggered the largest 
crisis the world has seen since the Great Depression. The 
bursting of the Irish and Spanish bubbles threatened 
national solvency, not just bank solvency. 
Central bankers and other macroeconomic policymakers 
stood by and watched the problems accumulating because 
they thought it was sufficient to conduct monetary policy 
and microprudential supervision. But the former is only 
concerned with the inflation of consumer goods, ignoring 
inflated asset prices in the objective function. And the 
latter is only concerned with the soundness of individual 
financial institutions, using internal models that are run on 
the assumption that risk is exogenous. The global financial 
and euro sovereign crises showed that the financial system 
as a whole matters and that the unravelling of risk has 
endogenous feedback loops (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). 
Figure 1 shows the new policy framework and 
places macroprudential supervision in the middle of 
monetary policy and microprudential supervision. 
Macroprudentialism has moved to the centre of the 
policy agenda (Baker, 2013) and interacts with both 
other policy areas. Macroprudential supervision 
operates at the level of the financial system and is 
concerned with the impact on the wider economy. Asia 
learned its lesson after its own crisis in the late 1990s, 
and introduced macroprudential policies earlier. Hong 
Kong, for example, has adopted an aggressive loan-to-
value policy, under which the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority reduces the ratio for new mortgages when 
house prices are rising too fast.
Central banks are returning to their roots by re-assuming 
a broad mandate. History teaches us that central banks 
have always had a dual role: maintaining price stability 
and financial stability (Goodhart, 2011). Accordingly, 
financial stability departments of central banks have 
been strengthened. Moreover, new structures are being 
put in place to facilitate proper coordination between 
the major players: finance ministries, central banks and 
financial supervisors (for details, see ASC, 2014). At the 
global level, the Financial Stability Board coordinates 
between the authorities of the major countries.
There is consensus on the broad objectives of 
macroprudential supervision. With respect to the time 
dimension, macroprudentialism should increase the 
resilience of the financial system against financial shocks. 
But then the disagreement sets in. Borio (2014b), for 
example, calls for modesty and aims just to increase the 
resilience of the financial system against financial shocks. 
In contrast, Gersbach and Rochet (2014) would go 
further, preferring countercyclical policies to constrain 
financial booms, which are fuelled by credit growth.
On the overall policy framework, there is a long-
standing debate on how monetary and macroprudential 
policies should interact. Tucker (2014) stresses the role 
of macroprudential policy as separate from that of 
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and Moore, 1997; Geanakoplos, 2010). A first example is 
investment banks, which expand their business with high 
levels of debt during good times (Adrian and Shin, 2010). 
Another example is housing finance, with increasingly 
large mortgages granted during housing booms (Almeida 
et al, 2006). Likewise, leveraged buyouts by private 
equity firms are subject to boom-bust cycles and relatively 
large portions of debt financing (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009). Financial markets can also be pro-cyclical when 
haircuts for securities financing transactions are reduced 
in good times and increased in bad times (Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen, 2009). At the turning point of the financial 
cycle, a small initial shock might trigger a margin and 
loss spiral that impedes funding and market liquidity. A 
similar interaction between leverage and funding liquidity 
also operates in the banking system (Pierret, 2015).
Although the exact form in which a speculative bubble 
manifests itself might differ each time, the underlying 
dynamics are the same. Yet, Galbraith (1993) observed 
dryly: 
 “What will not be discussed is that speculation itself 
or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it. Nothing 
is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of 
speculation, the reality will [be] all but ignored.”
We develop a simple model illustrating how debt 
financing can amplify financial shocks (Schoenmaker 
and Wierts, 2015). Financial firms’ assets A are financed 
by equity E and debt D. Leverage is defined as debt over 
equity L=D/E. Assuming that the nominal value of debt 
is constant, a change in the value of assets 
a
tg  is added 
as profit to equity etg :
 0 0 0(1 ) (1 )
a e
t t tA g A g E D= + = + +   (1)
 
where subscript t is for time. Using our definition of 
leverage gives the following relationship between asset 
and equity growth:
        
 0(1 )
e a
t tg g L= +  (2)
Next, financial firms have to choose their leverage. Profit 
maximisation is the key driver behind the financial firms’ 
choice of leverage, subject to maximum desirable risk 
(risk appetite). Individual firms trade off private return 
re versus private risk and do not internalise market 
failures from high leverage and maturity mismatch. 
Leverage will amplify the impact of the return difference 
between assets  ra and debt  rd on the private return:
     
= + −( )e a a dt t t t tr r r r L    (3)
monetary policy. Macroprudential policy takes a more 
granular approach by targeting particular markets 
or sectors, such as housing and property markets. In 
contrast, Borio (2014b) argues that monetary and 
macroprudential policies work in tandem since monetary 
policy influences risk perceptions and risk appetite (the 
risk-taking channel). A third view is that of Stein (2013), 
who says that monetary policy is more pervasive because 
it “gets in all the cracks” of the financial system.
Finally, there is the issue of how to strike the right balance 
between macroprudentialism and microprudentialism? 
A number of authors argue that macro stability should 
have priority over micro soundness (Schoenmaker 
and Kremers, 2014; Tucker, 2014). Until recently, the 
prevalent approach to financial stability implicitly 
assumed that the system as a whole can be made safe by 
making individual financial institutions safe. But now it 
is widely agreed that this idea, which was at the basis of 
original Basel banking supervision, represents a fallacy of 
composition. The fallacy of composition (Brunnermeier 
et al, 2009) derives from the fact that, when trying to make 
themselves safer, financial institutions can behave in a way 
that collectively undermines the stability of the system. 
Selling an asset when the price of risk increases may be a 
prudent response from the perspective of an individual 
financial institution, but if many financial institutions 
act in this way, the asset price will collapse, forcing 
financial institutions to take yet further steps to rectify 
the situation. The responses of the financial institutions 
themselves to such pressures lead to generalised 
declines in asset prices, and enhanced correlations and 
volatility in asset markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). 
Insofar as they neglect these general equilibrium effects, 
microprudential policies can be destructive at the 
macroeconomic level. In a more reflective mode, Borio 
(2014b) argues that macroprudentialism stands for an 
intellectual orientation or lens through which the task 
of achieving financial stability is understood. Prudential 
tools should be designed through a macro lens instead of 
the prevailing micro lens.
2.1 The case for countercyclical macroprudential 
supervision
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document a long history of 
debt financed booms and busts, with severe implications 
for financial stability and the real economy. There 
are various amplification mechanisms at work in the 
financial system, which are endogenous. The basic 
mechanism is that debt financing (leverage) is increased 
to maximise profits during good times, when asset values 
(collateral) are high and measured risk is low (Kiyotaki 
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The incentive to leverage depends on the difference in 
the return from assets and debt.2 A profit-maximising 
financial firm will maximise its leverage for a given risk, 
when asset returns are higher than the cost of debt (asset 
boom), and vice versa (asset bust). During the upswing 
of the financial cycle, the return differential is magnified 
both by rising asset prices and cheap short-term funding 
(Perotti and Suarez, 2011), so that financial institutions 
increase profits by expanding balance sheets and building 
up maturity mismatches. Adrian and Shin (2010) show 
that US investment banks not only brought leverage back 
to its initial level through balance-sheet adjustment, but 
even increased leverage in the run-up to the financial 
crisis. Similarly, ESRB (2015a) shows that leverage was 
pro-cyclical in the EU banking system.
In our model, we use the conservative assumption in 
terms of behavioural response that a profit-maximising 
financial institution would ‘only’ bring leverage back to 
its initial level L0. Given that debt has a constant value 
in nominal terms, the level of debt grows with the same 
growth rate as the price change in equity:
 0 0 0(1 ) (1 (1 ))
b e a
t t tD g D g L D= + = + +  (4)
where superscript b indicates that this is a behavioural 
response. This produces a second round behavioural 
effect on assets: 
 0 0(1 (1 ))
b a
t tA g L A= + +  (5)
The ultimate increase of a financial institution’s balance 
sheet  thus depends on the growth in asset prices and the 
level of its initial leverage. Figure 2 illustrates the effect 
on a financial institution’s balance sheet with leverage 
and feedback effect on asset prices. We assume asset 
price growth of 2.5 per cent in period 1, and a moderate 
feedback effect of 0.1 in each period on the asset price 
growth rate in the previous period, so that it drops to zero 
in a few periods and the size of the balance sheet stabilises. 
Various levels of initial leverage L0 = D0/E0 are used: L0 = 
24 = 96/4; L0 = 9 = 90/10; L0 = 4 = 80/20. We also show 
the case of no leverage L0 = 0. The balance sheet expands 
very rapidly for higher levels of initial leverage, but not 
in the case of no leverage. Note that the example with a 
high leverage of 24 corresponds to the current situation 
for banks, in which banks have about 4 per cent equity 
capital (unweighted) and 96 per cent debt. 
Similarly, the balance sheet shrinks during bad times, 
when the return on assets is below the return on debt. 
As the financial institution makes a loss, equity will 
decrease. To keep leverage constant, the institution 
has to cut back its debt (for example, by reducing its 
wholesale funding). This is the infamous process of 
deleveraging that we experienced in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis.
The key take-aways from our simple model are threefold 
(Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). First, modest levels 
of debt financing might already lead to relatively large 
expansion of the balance sheets of financial firms in 
upturns. Second, the feedback loop of asset price shocks 
on the balance sheet is endogenous. A return differential 
on assets and debt of 2.5 per cent combined with leverage 
of 24 (which is common in banking) leads to a 75 per cent 
expansion of the financial firm’s balance sheet. Third, 
for higher initial leverage, the policy adjustment would 
need to be stronger to constrain excessive balance-sheet 
growth at financial institutions (note that the asset side 
of financial institutions’ balance sheets approximates 
the provision of finance – predominantly credit – to 
the private sector). Restricting maximum permissible 
leverage would dampen amplification of the financial 
cycle, as we discuss in Section 4.
Our model with profit-maximising financial institutions 
driving leverage fits in a new strand of models on 
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Figure 2. Balance sheet growth with leverage
Source: Schoenmaker and Wierts (2015).
Note: Assumed price growth is 2.5 per cent. The feedback effect on asset 
prices is 0.1 for each simulated leverage L = D/E = 0; 4; 9; 24.
Leverage = 24
Leverage = 9
Leverage = 4
Leverage = 0
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countercyclical macroprudential policy. Aikman et al. 
(2015) develop a slightly different model, in which risk 
taking is driven by reputational concerns. Banks have 
an incentive to produce high returns – if necessary by 
excessive risk-taking – when other banks announce 
high returns. They call this the ‘keeping up with the 
Goldmans’ effect. The result of their model is similar, 
a credit cycle with large amplifications. Acharya and 
Naqvi (2012) show that volume-based compensation 
for loan officers induces excessive risk-taking and credit 
creation. Gersbach and Rochet (2014) find that banks 
allocate too much borrowing capacity to good states and 
too little to bad states, because bankers aim to maximise 
their rents from lending, taking capital prices and prices 
of financial assets as given.
2.2 Macroprudential supervision in the Euro Area
Special considerations apply to the Euro Area in 
the presence of the monetary and banking union. 
Macroprudential policy is even more important in a 
monetary union. With a ‘one-size-fits-all’ monetary 
policy, proactive macroprudential policies are needed to 
address financial imbalances at the country level. While 
there is clear evidence that the financial cycles differ at 
the country level (Merler, 2015), there is no consensus on 
the appropriate level of coordination. Figure 3 depicts the 
current division of powers. In monetary and supervisory 
policy, the European Central Bank (ECB) takes the lead 
with some contributing role for national central banks 
(NCBs) and national competent authorities (NCAs). In 
contrast, in macroprudential policy the NCAs have the 
first say, with the ECB in a secondary role. 
Sapir (2014) and Schoenmaker (2014) argue for a 
strong role for the ECB. If too much is left to the 
national level, emerging financial imbalances might go 
unchecked in some countries. There is also a risk of 
inconsistent application of macroprudential tools, while 
there are strong cross-border stability effects within a 
monetary and banking union. Finally, a consistent policy 
framework for a broader financial union suggests the 
alignment of the various policy tools at the same level.
3. Measuring financial imbalances
The global financial crisis has reminded us that we need 
to include financial sector variables in macroeconomic 
analysis (e.g. Drehmann et al., 2012; Borio, 2014a). 
The so-called financial cycle, which measures financial 
imbalances, is a key input for defining the macroprudential 
policy stance. The regular publication of the financial 
cycle will visually raise the awareness of policymakers. 
We propose to start central banks’ financial stability 
reviews with an update of the financial cycle, just as the 
monetary report starts with the inflation outlook. While 
the latter is on a monthly or quarterly basis, financial 
cycle dynamics are more prolonged (see below). The 
update could therefore follow the biannual rhythm of 
the financial stability review. 
Section 3.1 discusses the choice of indicators, an 
important methodological issue, and the relationship 
with the business cycle. Section 3.2 shows the current 
financial cycles across the Euro Area, illustrating major 
divergence between counties.
3.1 How to measure the financial cycle?
Which financial indicators can be used to measure the 
financial cycle? On the one hand, you might want to 
extract as much information from financial variables as 
possible, which is a paradise for econometricians. On 
the other hand, you might want to keep the number 
of variables as parsimonious as possible. Moreover, 
the choice of a few key variables, which are easily 
understandable, aids the policy process. It helps when 
policymakers understand which variables are driving the 
financial cycle, instead of deriving the financial cycle as 
an outcome from an abstract, statistical, analysis.
In a historical survey covering 1870 to 2008, Schularick 
and Taylor (2012) showed that cyclical fluctuations in 
credit are at the heart of the boom-bust cycle. The next 
question is which assets are financed by these episodes of 
credit expansion (and subsequent contraction). In follow-
up work, Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2015) studied 
bubbles in housing and equity markets over the past 
140 years in seventeen countries. They demonstrate that 
what makes some bubbles more dangerous than others is 
credit. When fuelled by credit booms, asset price bubbles 
increase financial crisis risks; upon collapse they tend to 
be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. 
Credit-financed house price bubbles have emerged as a 
particularly dangerous phenomenon. These findings are Source: Schoenmaker (2014).
Figure 3. Policy framework for the Euro Area
Union Dimension Major players
 Monetary
Monetary union  ECB with NCBs
 Macro
  NCAs with ECB
Banking union
  ECB with NCAs
 Micro
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consistent with earlier work by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) and Claessens et al. (2014), who also show that 
the vast majority of banking crises are related to house 
price cycles.
Credit booms fuel house prices and increase the leverage 
of borrowers (in particular households). This leaves 
households vulnerable to declines in house prices and 
tightening of credit conditions. When the correction 
occurs, households run into debt servicing problems, 
which cause reductions in consumption negatively 
impacting on economic growth as well as payment 
arrears on mortgages or foreclosures leading to systemic 
risks in the financial system.
Drehmann et al. (2012) also found that credit and 
property prices tend to co-vary rather closely with each 
other, especially at low frequencies, confirming the 
importance of credit in the financing of construction 
and the purchase of property. In addition, the 
variability in the two series is dominated by the low-
frequency components. By contrast, equity prices can 
be a distraction. They co-vary with the other two series 
far less. And much of their variability concentrates at 
comparatively higher frequencies. Claessens et al. (2011) 
investigate credit, housing and equity cycles. They also 
report strong co-movements in credit and housing cycles. 
Credit cycles accompanied by housing cycles typically 
last longer and are more pronounced. Next, Claessens et 
al. (2011) find that signals from equity cycles are noisy, 
as these are shorter-lived and coincide less with financial 
crises. 
Schüler et al. (2015) include equity and bond prices in 
addition to credit and property assets. They conclude 
that their composite financial cycle performs better 
at predicting financial crises than single or bivariate 
composed indicators. Nevertheless, Schüler et al. (2015) 
also find that credit and house prices are characterised 
by medium-term cycles, while equity and bond prices 
have important fluctuations both at medium and short-
term cycle frequencies.3
Finally, Borio (2014a) characterises the financial cycle 
in relation to the business cycle. First, the financial cycle 
has a stronger amplitude. Borio (2014a) finds that the 
financial cycle has a five times greater amplitude than the 
business cycle. Next, Borio (2014a) reports an average 
length of sixteen years, while Schüler et al. (2015) find 
a length of 7.2 years. While the exact length may differ 
in different studies, they all indicate that the average 
length is longer than that of the business cycle. This 
reinforces the earlier argument that the financial cycle 
can be qualified as a medium-term phenomenon, which 
is best captured by credit and property prices that also 
have a medium-term frequency. Figure 4 illustrates the 
differences in the business and financial cycles in the US 
for the 1970–2013 period. 
Source: Adapted from Borio (2014a).
Note: The red line traces the financial cycle measured by the combined behaviour of the component series (credit, the credit to GDP ratio and house 
prices). The black line traces the GDP cycle.
Figure 4. The business and financial cycle in the US (1970–2013)
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In sum, a range of indicators has been proposed in the 
literature, ranging from credit as a key variable (e.g. 
Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Aikman et al., 2015), to 
credit and property prices (e.g. Claessens et al., 2011; 
Drehmann et al., 2012; Borio, 2014a) and credit, 
property, equity and bond prices (e.g. Schüler et al., 
2015). But while preferences differ on parsimonious 
versus complex methods, all authors appear to agree 
on the relevance of including credit and property prices. 
These variables should not be read as indicators for 
where the next crisis will come from, but as a general 
measurement of financial imbalances which makes the 
economy crisis-prone in the Minsky sense.
3.2 The financial cycle in the Euro Area
Moving to Europe, we are interested to see the behaviour 
of the financial cycle in the Euro Area. Do the aggregate 
and country cycles move in tandem? Merler (2015) 
investigates the financial cycle, based on the variance of 
credit growth and real house price growth, for the period 
from 1971 till 2014. Figure 5 illustrates the aggregate 
financial cycle for the Euro Area and its sub-regions. 
The North comprises Germany and the Netherlands. 
The Centre encompasses France and Italy. The South 
consists of Ireland and Spain. Figure 5 clearly shows that 
financial cycles have differed across the Euro Area since 
the late 1990s, the start of the euro. The single monetary 
policy might have contributed to the divergence of the 
financial cycle.
Another interesting finding is that the periphery countries 
in the ‘South’ faced a strong expansion ahead of the 
global financial crisis, which started in 2007, while the 
aggregate Euro Area cycle is more moderate (Merler, 
2015). This reinforces the point that macroprudential 
policy needs to be applied at country level across Europe. 
Importantly, if a countercyclical macroprudential policy 
had been in place at the start of the euro, this might 
have dampened the financial cycle in the periphery 
countries (Jiménez et al., 2015). But we do not know 
the counterfactual, of course. Nevertheless, figure 5 
strongly suggests that countercyclical macroprudential 
instruments are very useful and need to be differentiated 
across countries.
Figure 6, also taken from Merler (2015), shows the 
financial cycle for the six countries. Panel C for Spain and 
Ireland shows that the introduction of the euro seemed 
to coincide with the start of a big expansion phase in 
the financial cycle. In Ireland, there was a temporary 
downturn related to the dot-com bubble burst, but it was 
quickly reverted into an expansion phase. In Germany 
Source: Merler (2015). 
Note: The financial cycle is based on credit growth and growth in real house prices. A band-pass filter is applied to isolate specifically medium-term cycles, 
defined as cycles in real credit growth or real house prices with duration between 8 and 30 years. The information from these two cycles is eventually 
combined into a summary indicator, by means of principal component analysis. EA is the Euro Area; North is Germany and the Netherlands; Centre is 
France and Italy; South is Spain and Ireland.
Figure 5. Financial cycle in the Euro Area
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Figure 6. Financial cycles – individual countries (black lines) vs Euro Area (red line)
Source: Merler (2015). 
Note: See Figure 5.
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and the Netherlands (Panel A), the opposite happened, 
and both countries entered a contraction phase in the 
late 1990s. Contraction lasted till 2010 in Germany and 
longer in the Netherlands. Finally, Panel B indicates that 
France and Italy instead moved very closely to the Euro 
Area financial cycle.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the power of visual presentation. 
Regular reporting in the ECB Financial Stability Review 
of the unfolding financial cycles in the participating 
countries might have alerted policymakers. The next 
step is an appropriate instrument to curb the cycle.
4. Policy
The Tinbergen Rule suggests that we need a new 
instrument separate from monetary policy for financial 
stability purposes. While the underlying mechanism of 
amplification of the financial cycle through leverage in 
Section 2 is general, macroprudential policy instruments 
are developed in silos (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). 
The Basel policy response with a countercyclical capital 
buffer and a leverage ratio is only directed at banks. By 
contrast, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are borrower-based 
and can be designed so that they apply to all financial 
institutions that grant mortgages.4 But sectoral regulations 
intensify the boundary problem (Goodhart, 2008). When 
regulation for one sector is tightened, business will shift 
to other sectors with less or no requirements. Cizel et 
al. (2015) find evidence for the cross-sector substitution 
effects of macroprudential policy. 
An important question is whether macroprudential policy 
should address a financial boom that is concentrated 
in a particular sector or an economy wide financial 
boom. Wherever possible, a specific macroprudential 
instrument to address the build-up of imbalances in 
a particular sector is preferable. But the model and 
subsequent analysis in this paper is concerned with 
general financial imbalances, in the spirit of Minsky 
(1986). As credit becomes more easily available in the 
upswing of the financial cycle, financial imbalances 
are building up across the economy. A sector-by-sector 
approach may then miss some segments or induce 
migration of activities, especially to newly emerging 
segments such as securitisation of sub-prime mortgages 
in the run-up to the global financial crisis. In a similar 
vein, monetary policy follows a general approach in 
curbing the consumer price index instead of the prices 
of particular consumption goods.
There are several proposals for countercyclical 
macroprudential policy instruments to curb the financial 
cycle. Gersbach (2011) proposes a leverage ratio for the 
banking system to moderate credit cycles and to reduce 
the likelihood of financial crises. His banking system-
wide leverage ratio is defined as;
• total equity in the banking sector (held by non-banks) 
to
• total end-borrower lending (loans to non-financial 
firms, households, and governments), plus other non-
bank assets. 
As the system leverage ratio applies to the banking 
system as a whole, the leverage ratios for individual 
banks can differ according to their risk profile. An 
interesting feature is that Gersbach’s system leverage 
ratio is really a macro instrument, which can be used in 
a time-varying manner. The aggregate leverage ratio for 
the next period, for example, depends on the ratio that 
is currently set, the state of money and credit, and on 
current vulnerabilities of the banking system (Gersbach, 
2011). While it is impossible to specify a fixed formula 
for determining the aggregate leverage ratio, Gersbach 
stresses that it is essential that such policies are as 
systematic, transparent and accountable as traditional 
monetary policy rules.
More generally, several authors have studied the 
appropriate design of countercyclical capital buffers, 
as currently employed in the Basel 3 capital adequacy 
framework (see, for example, Drehman et al., 2011; 
Gersbach and Rochet, 2014). Aikman et al. (2015) 
propose to apply anti-cyclical capital and liquidity 
requirements or to tie remuneration packages to long-
term performance to curb the credit cycle. Importantly, 
the latter authors argue that these instruments should 
be applied across borders and sectors to prevent cross-
border and cross-sector leakages.
4.1 A common leverage ratio across the financial 
system5
We have proposed a countercyclical (i.e. time-varying) 
leverage ratio to dampen the endogenous feedback 
loops in credit growth (and decline) and thus stabilise 
the financial cycle (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). 
This instrument is designed in the spirit of Gersbach 
(2011), but applied to individual financial institutions 
and their transactions. This new framework differs from 
the traditional view on regulation of equity as a buffer 
against unexpected losses caused by exogenous shocks. 
Whereas the ‘buffer view’ can only motivate relatively 
small capital buffers, our new framework calls for 
much lower levels of leverage in the system to constrain 
excessive credit growth.
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As discussed earlier, an integrated approach to regulate 
leverage is necessary to stabilise the financial cycle across 
the financial system. We therefore start with harmonising 
the terminology on leverage (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 
2015). Under the Basel 3 capital requirements, the 
leverage ratio for banks is:
  
      
        
Equity
LR=
Total exposure  (6)
The leverage ratio can be applied to any type of financial 
institution, such as banks, special purpose vehicles (SPVs), 
or hedge funds. It can also be applied to collateralised 
transactions of different entities, such as securities 
financing transactions (e.g. repos) or mortgages. As the 
value of assets can vary depending on credit and market 
risk, the transaction is typically ‘overcollateralised’, 
whereby more assets are provided than the underlying 
loan (debt). This excess is called a haircut:
      
   
( )Assets price Debt Equity
Haircut=
Assets price Assets price
∗ −
=
∗ ∗    (7)
Finally, a typical indicator used in housing finance is the 
loan-to-value ratio:
        
  
        
Debt
LTV=
Asset price∗  (8)
Comparing the different yardsticks for leverage, we get 
LR = Haircut = 1–LTV. Following Basel 3, we propose 
to use the leverage ratio, which is defined as a minimum 
equity requirement, as the basis for a system-wide 
regulatory leverage requirement. This common leverage 
ratio is equivalent to a maximum debt requirement to 
constrain credit.
Microprudential regulation attunes the leverage ratio 
for each (regulated) segment to the underlying risk for 
an individual institution or market. We observe a wide 
range of leverage ratios across the financial system from 
1 per cent for special purpose vehicles to 20 per cent for 
mortgages (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). We introduce 
our minimum common leverage ratio to stabilise the 
financial cycle. This macroprudential requirement 
should override microprudential requirements, as the 
former internalises the endogenous effects of leverage 
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). Again in the spirit 
of Gersbach (2011), the countercyclical application 
of our common leverage ratio depends on the state of 
credit, i.e. where we are in the financial cycle. In the 
upswing, the common leverage ratio will be increased to 
slow down credit growth, while in the downswing, the 
ratio will be decreased to stimulate credit growth.
In Schoenmaker and Wierts (2015), we illustrate 
the working of the common leverage ratio with a 
hypothetical example of a minimum leverage ratio 
requirement of 10 per cent at the macro level applied to 
debt-based financing across the financial system (which 
is equivalent to leverage of 9 in figure 2). This 10 per cent 
would then serve as a minimum across all debt-financed 
segments of the financial system, mitigating the boundary 
problem. In individual segments, the minimum leverage 
ratio could be higher if and when micro considerations 
require a higher minimum requirement.
4.2 What would change in practice?
Market failures and systemic risk are not unique to 
regulated banking. Examples include: the near collapse 
of hedge fund LTCM in 1998 because of excessive 
leverage; market-based finance and securitisation in the 
run-up to the financial crisis, which exacerbated the 
upswing of the financial cycle; the default of Lehman, 
a highly leveraged investment bank; the run on money 
market funds because of maturity mismatch (i.e. the 
perception of a nominally stable net asset value); and 
pro-cyclicality in the repo market (Gorton and Metrick, 
2012). At the same time, macroprudential instruments 
have until now mostly been applied to banks, causing 
substitution effects (Cizel et al., 2015). What would be 
the practical implications of our proposed system-wide 
application of the leverage ratio?
Table 1 summarises existing instruments and ongoing 
discussions on the regulation of leverage. The message is 
that limits on leverage already exist for banks, investment 
funds and residential real estate. And extensions are under 
discussion, e.g. margin requirements for collateralised 
derivatives and securities financing transactions. But the 
instrument has not yet been developed from a holistic 
perspective: a common minimum while allowing for 
country- and sector-specific calibrations, to address 
differences in financial cycles across countries and 
sector-specific risks such as those related to real estate.
The first step is to compare definitions and to make them 
consistent, including on the impact of derivatives on 
synthetic leverage both for banks and investment funds 
(ECB, 2015a). A holistic approach to minimum haircuts 
and margins in both centrally- and non-centrally cleared 
transactions should be developed (ESRB, 2015b). And 
leverage requirements for Alternative Investment Funds 
R60    NatioNal iNstitute ecoNomic Review No. 235 FebRuaRy 2016
– including hedge funds and private equity – should 
be made operational given that the legal base has been 
created already. All this would allow for initial discussions 
on the top-down calibration of all instruments together.
The second step is to analyse the interaction between 
leverage requirements, including possible gaps and 
overlaps. On gaps, for example, some countries have 
recently started to apply monitoring requirements on 
‘non-securitisation’ SPVs. On possible overlaps, for 
example, the imposition of leverage requirements on the 
banking sector sparked a discussion about its effects on 
banks’ securities and financing transactions, i.e. their 
possible migration to less-regulated entities. Likewise, 
the combination of a leverage requirement on banks 
with an LTV limit for their borrowers might lead to the 
migration of mortgage financing to less-regulated non-
banks. This could be seen as a desirable side effect, as 
Europe suffers from a bank bias that increases systemic 
risks and reduces economic growth (Langfield and 
Pagano, 2016). But the point is that policymakers should 
be in a position to take a holistic view on introducing 
and withdrawing such incentives.
The third step is to incorporate the new instrument 
consistently in legislation. The European Commission 
is responsible for proposing financial sector regulation 
in the EU/EEA. As the Commission follows a sectoral 
approach, the directives and/or regulations for the various 
debt-financed sectors might need to be adapted and 
extended with a macroprudential section. As indicated, 
several segments are already subject to the possibility of 
regulation on leverage, such as banks under the Capital 
Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR/CRD 
IV) and hedge funds and private equity under the so-
called Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(AIFMD). Whereas the authorities can already adjust 
leverage requirements for alternative investment funds 
to address systemic risk, similar provisions are under 
discussion for the banking sector (ESRB, 2015a). Next, 
securities and derivative transactions are subject to 
margin calls or haircuts under the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). These rules should 
be adapted to provide the authorities with the power 
to allow for a common and countercyclical application 
(ESRB, 2015b, ECB, 2015b). Importantly, ECB (2015b) 
argues that these tools should be applied to counterparties 
at transaction level so that all relevant transactions are 
within scope, irrespective of how they are cleared. This 
would mimic our preferred legal design for LTV/LTI 
caps and create a consistent legal approach (table 1).
On the institutional side, the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) should be given an advisory role on the 
application of the common leverage ratio, as the ESRB 
is responsible for monitoring systemic risk across the 
EU and making recommendations when it identifies 
systemic threats. A building up of financial imbalances 
that are unsustainable would qualify as such a threat. 
Moving to execution, the respective central banks – in 
their capacity as macroprudential authorities – need to get 
Table 1. Macroprudential instruments for regulating leverage
 Entities Transactions by entity 
  (collateralised financing)
Regulated
 Banks Investment funds Real estate transactions Derivatives and securities
    financing transactions
 EU:CRR/CRD IV: EU: alternative National legislation: Under discussion:
 Minimum leverage investment funds LTV/LTI caps for Minimum or countercyclical margin
 ratio (AIFMD) residential real estate and haircut requirements for 
  Option to impose  centrally cleared transactions (ESRB,
 Under discussion leverage Under discussion: 2015b) and non-centrally cleared
 Macroprudential requirements LTV/LTI limits for transactions (BCBS-IOSCO, 2015;
Regulation use of the leverage  commercial real estate FSB, 2014).(a) Application should
 ratio – aligning it with EU:UCITS:  be to counterparties at transaction
 the countercyclical Borrowing up to  level, independent of how they are
 capital buffer 10% of assets allowed  cleared (ECB, 2015b)
 (ESRB, 2015a) for temporary 
  purposes
Note: (a) Both EMIR and the draft Securities Financing Transactions Regulation do not at this stage provide for macroprudential use of margin and haircuts 
by authorities. EMIR does however contain minimum standards for CCPs that aim at addressing pro-cyclicality (ESRB, 2015b).
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the powers in the newly drafted macroprudential sections 
of the above-mentioned directives and regulations to 
apply the countercyclical instrument, independent of 
politicians. The execution of macroprudential policy is, 
just as monetary policy, subject to pressures from the 
election cycle. Moreover, these powers should also allow 
for a macro application of the instrument with a view to 
financial stability.
As suggested in Section 2, the ECB should under the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) become responsible for 
the consistent application of macroprudential instruments 
within the Euro Area and internalisation of cross-border 
effects. The ECB would also be able to assess the trade-
offs between the different financial policies – monetary, 
macroprudential and microprudential – at the same level, 
just like the Bank of England in the United Kingdom.6 
While the NCBs are necessary to provide input on the 
financial conditions in their respective financial systems, 
the ECB should therefore in conjunction with the NCBs 
have the power to set the minimum countercyclical 
leverage ratio. The leverage ratio could then be 
differentiated across countries, because the financial cycle 
differs between them.
5. Conclusions
There has been much debate on the need for 
macroprudential policy in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. Academics and policymakers have 
advanced various theories and models, but a consensus 
on the right approach has not yet emerged. Nevertheless, 
we call the central banking community to arms. The 
current monetary policy stance of quantitative easing 
might be needed to avert potential deflationary drifts and 
stimulate subdued growth, the risk of financial booms 
is increasing as the BIS has repeatedly warned. In the 
Tinbergen tradition, we propose a separate instrument 
to constrain excessive credit growth. The good news is 
that central banks are starting to measure and publish 
the financial cycle, which provides the necessary input 
for determining the macroprudential policy stance.
While there is an emerging consensus that countercyclical 
capital ratios are helpful, there is widespread doubt that 
the current 2.5 per cent countercyclical buffer as part of 
the risk-weighted capital ratio will suffice to break a full-
blown credit cycle. With an average risk weight of less 
than 40 per cent, the 2.5 per cent risk-weighted buffer 
translates to a countercyclical leverage buffer of less than 
1 per cent. Simulations indicate that a countercyclical 
leverage buffer of up to 2 per cent is more appropriate to 
dampen an asset price shock (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 
2015).
We therefore propose a bold approach based on the 
leverage ratio. Bold because the range of appropriate 
leverage ratios to constrain the financial cycle is likely 
to go beyond the current leverage ratio of 3 per cent. 
We recommend starting calibrations on an appropriate 
range for the leverage ratio. Our proposal is also bold 
because the common leverage ratio should be applied 
across all parts of the financial system that are highly 
leveraged. As banks are deleveraging, non-bank credit 
is growing. This warrants a system-wide approach to 
constrain excessive credit growth.
To stimulate (bold) action, we would like to leave the 
reader with a final thought. Policymakers and academics 
(including ourselves) love to read again and quote the 
classics such as Galbraith (1993) and Kindleberger and 
Aliber (2011) after each financial crisis. Some more 
attention to them in the upswing of the financial cycle 
might, hopefully, reduce future citations.
NOTES
1 This section draws partly upon the introduction of a VoxEU 
book on Macroprudentialism (Schoenmaker, 2014).
2 As banks’ assets have a longer maturity than debt, leverage 
interacts with maturity mismatch. If short-term funding markets 
are liquid and term-premia are positive, leverage and maturity 
transformation are likely to go hand-in-hand.
3 Bond yields are also relevant for the shorter frequency business 
cycles, which are analysed for monetary policy purposes. In 
order to keep monetary and macroprudential policies separate, 
authorities may choose not to include bond yields in the financial 
cycle.
4 However, LTV caps have mostly been applied to banks in 
practice (Cizel et al., 2015).
5 This sub-section draws upon Schoenmaker and Wierts (2015).
6 The combination of all these financial policies would lead to 
a concentration of powers. Appropriate transparency and 
accountability mechanisms are important.
REFERENCES
Acharya, V. and Naqvi, H. (2012), ‘The seeds of a crisis: a theory of 
bank liquidity and risk-taking over the business cycle’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 106, pp. 349–66. 
Adrian, T. and Shin, H. (2010), ‘Liquidity and leverage’, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 19, pp. 418–37.
Advisory Scientific Committee (ASC) (2014), Allocating Macro-
Prudential Powers, Report No. 5 of the Advisory Scientific 
Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board.
Aikman, D., Haldane, A. and Nelson, B. (2015), ‘Curbing the credit 
cycle’, The Economic Journal, 125, pp. 1072–109.
Almeida, H., Campello, M. and Liu, C. (2006), ‘The financial 
accelerator: evidence from international housing markets’, 
Review of Finance, 10, pp. 321–52.
Baker, A. (2013), ‘The new political economy of the macroprudential 
ideational shift’, New Political Economy, 18, pp. 112–39.
Barth, J. and Wihlborg, C. (2016), ‘Too big to fail and too big to 
save: dilemmas for banking reform’, National Institute Economic 
Review, 235, February.
R62    NatioNal iNstitute ecoNomic Review No. 235 FebRuaRy 2016
BCBS-IOSCO (2015), Margin Requirements for Non-Centrally Cleared 
Derivatives, Basel.
Borio, C. (2014a), ‘The financial cycle and macroeconomics: what 
have we learnt?’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 45, pp. 182–98.
—(2014b), ‘(Too) great expectations for macro-prudential?’, Central 
Banking Journal, 41, pp. 79–85.
Brunnermeier, M., Crockett, A.,Goodhart, C., Persaud, A. and Shin, 
H. (2009), ‘The fundamental principles of financial regulation’, 
Geneva Report on the World Economy, vol. 11. CEPR, London.
Brunnermeier, M. and Pedersen, L. (2009), ‘Market liquidity and 
funding liquidity’, Review of Financial Studies, 22, pp. 2201–38.
Brunnermeier, M. and Sannikov, Y. (2014), ‘A macroeconomic 
model with a financial sector’, American Economic Review, 104, 
pp. 379–421.
Cizel, J., Frost, J., Houben, A. and Wierts, P. (2015), ‘Effective 
macroprudential policy: cross-sector substitution of price and 
quantity measures’, IMF Working Paper.
Claessens, S., Kose, M., Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2014), Financial 
Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, Washington 
DC: IMF.
Claessens, S., Kose, M. and Terrone, M. (2011), ‘Financial cycles: 
what? how? when?’, in Clarida, R. and Giavazzi, F. (eds), NBER 
International Seminar in Macroeconomics 2010, pp. 303–43.
Danielsson, J. (2013), Global Financial Systems: Stability and Risk, 
Harlow: Pearson.
Drehmann, M., Borio, C. and Tsatsaronis, K. (2011), ‘Anchoring 
countercyclical capital buffers: the role of credit aggregates’, 
International Journal of Central Banking, 7, pp. 189–239.
—(2012), ‘Characterising the financial cycle: don’t lose sight of the 
medium term!’, BIS Working Papers, No. 380.
ECB (2015a), ‘Synthetic leverage in the investment fund sector’, 
Financial Stability Review, Frankfurt: ECB.
—(2015b), ECB response to the European Commission’s consultation 
on the review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR), Frankfurt: ECB. 
ESRB (2015a), Handbook on the Macro-prudential Use of the Leverage 
Ratio, Frankfurt: European Systemic Risk Board.
—(2015b), ESRB Report on the Efficiency of Margining Requirements to 
Limit Pro-Cyclicality and the Need to Define Additional Intervention 
in this Policy Area, Frankfurt: European Systemic Risk Board’
FSB (2014), Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking 
– Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on Non-centrally Cleared 
Securities Financing Transactions, Basel: FSB.
Galati, G. and Moessner, R. (2013), ‘Macroprudential policy – a 
literature review’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 27, pp. 846–78.
—(2014), ‘What do we know about the effects of macroprudential 
policy?’, DNB Working Paper, No 440.
Galbraith, J.K. (1993), A Short History of Financial Euphoria, New 
York: Viking Penguin.
Geanakoplos, J. (2010), ‘The leverage cycle’, in Acemoglu, D., Rogoff, 
K. and Woodford, M. (eds), NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2009, 
24, pp. 1–65.
Gersbach, H. (2011), ‘A framework for two macro policy 
instruments: money and banking combined’, CEPR Policy 
Insight No. 58.
Gersbach, H. and Rochet, J.-Ch. (2014), ‘Capital regulation and credit 
fluctuations’, Working Paper, UZH and ETH Zurich.
Goodhart, C. (2008), ‘The boundary problem in financial regulation’, 
National Institute Economic Review, 206, pp. 48–55.
—(2011), ‘The changing role of central banks’, Financial History 
Review, 18, pp. 135–54.
—(2014), ‘The use of macroprudential instruments’, in Schoenmaker, 
D. (ed.), Macroprudentialism, London: CEPR, VoxEU eBook, pp. 
11–20.
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012), ‘Securitised banking and the 
run on repo’, Journal of Financial Economics, 102, pp. 435–51.
Hanson, S., Kashyap, A. and Stein, J. (2011), ‘A macroprudential 
approach to financial regulation’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
25, pp. 3–28.
Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydro, J.L. and Saurina Salas, J. (2015), 
‘Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and 
credit supply: evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning 
experiments’, Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2049284.
Jorda, O., Schularick, M. and Taylor, A. (2015) ‘Leveraged bubbles’, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, online 15 September.
Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘Leveraged buyouts and 
private equity, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23, pp. 121–46.
Kindleberger, C. and Aliber, R. (2011), Manias, Panics and Crashes: 
A History of Financial Crises, Sixth Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997), ‘Credit cycles’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 105, pp. 211–48.
Langfield, S. and Pagano, M. (2016), ‘Bank bias in Europe: effects on 
systemic risk and growth, Economic Policy (forthcoming).
Merler, S. (2015), ‘Squaring the cycle: financial cycles, capital flows 
and macroprudential policy, Bruegel Working Paper No. 
2015/14, Brussels.
Minsky, H. (1986), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Yale University 
Press.
Perotti, E. and Suarez, J. (2011), ‘A Pigovian approach to liquidity 
regulation’, International Journal of Central Banking, 7(4), pp. 3–41.
Pierret, D. (2015), ‘Systemic risk and the solvency-liquidity nexus of 
banks’, International Journal of Central Banking, 11(3), pp. 193–227.
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2009), This Time Is Different: Eight 
Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sapir, A. (2014), ‘Europe’s macroprudential policy framework 
in light of the banking union’, in Schoenmaker, D. (ed.), 
Macroprudentialism, London, CEPR: VoxEU eBook, pp. 161–70.
Schoenmaker, D. (2014), Macroprudentialism, London, CEPR, VoxEU 
eBook.
Schoenmaker, D. and Kremers, J. (2014), ‘Financial stability and 
proper business conduct: can supervisory structure help to 
achieve these objectives?’, in Huang, R. and Schoenmaker, D. 
(eds), Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: Theories and 
International Experiences, London: Routledge, pp. 29–39.
Schoenmaker, D. and Wierts, P. (2011), ‘Macroprudential policy: 
the need for a coherent policy framework’, Duisenberg School 
of Finance Policy Paper No.13.
—(2015), ‘Regulating the financial cycle: an integrated approach with 
a leverage ratio’, Economics Letters, 136, pp. 70–72.
Schularick, M. and Taylor, A. (2012), ‘Credit booms gone bust: 
monetary policy, leverage cycles and financial crises, 1870–2008’, 
American Economic Review, 102, pp. 1029–61.
Schüler, Y., Hiebert, P. and Peltonen, T. (2015), ‘Characterising the 
financial cycle: a multivariate and time-varying approach’, ECB 
Working Paper No. 1846.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2011), ‘Fire sales in finance and 
macroeconomics’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, pp. 29–48.
Stein, J. (2013), ‘Overheating in credit markets: origins, measurement, 
and policy responses’, remarks at a Research Symposium 
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 7 February.
Tucker, P. (2014), ‘The political economy of macroprudential 
regimes’, in Schoenmaker, D. (ed.), Macroprudentialism, London, 
CEPR: VoxEU eBook, pp. 61–72.
